Introduction
Since the early 1950s European integration has been shaped by political, economic and monetary forces. Although political integration provided the initial impulse for a European community, since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the authorities have chosen instead a process of functional integration (i.e. pursuing economic and financial integration in various incremental and feasible steps). As a result of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) the creation of the EU as a single market with 'four freedoms', and ultimately the formation of the EMU, are the final stages in this integration process, backed by coordination of national economic policies and harmonization of relevant domestic laws to avoid protectionism. However, the start of the euro sovereign debt crisis, hereinafter referred to as the euro crisis, has raised the question of whether the EMU is an optimal currency area (OCA), whereby the optimal size of the currency area is one that maximizes the benefits from having a single currency relative its costs. Since the start of the EMU there has been an economic consensus that the EMU was not actually an OCA, even though the euro may foster some incentives for bringing its members closer together. Nevertheless, the EMU is likely to move towards becoming an OCA over time because the convergence of the individual economies within the euro area is likely to increase as common laws and policies are adopted, the single market deepens and and any remaining trade barriers gradually disappear. However, the costs of asymmetric shocks and hence the costs of the EMU will be greater, the weaker the practice of the 'four freedoms', the less there will be price and wage flexibility, and, as a result, there will be fewer alternative policies to turn to. Although the single currency has boosted deeper economic and financial integration, for many years the members have built up imbalances and they differ so much structurally that the EMU is still a great distance away from being an OCA. Not all the benefits of the single market proved to be sustainable as they were predicated on cheap and abundant short-term funding channelled mostly by the banking system. The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, hereinafter referred to as the credit crisis, undermined European money markets and the evaporation of cheap liquidity greatly contributed to the lack of confidence in the soundness of the financial system. When the credit crisis spread to the euro area government debt market in late 2009, the belief that the EMU would act as a shield against exchange rate volatility and credit risks disappeared and the euro was gradually perceived as an economic trap. Several criteria for an OCA have been advanced, but since none of these criteria is likely to be fully satisfied, no currency area is ever optimum. When the common monetary policy gives rise to a conflict of national interests, the EMU members need to accept the costs for the sake of a common destiny. The 'impossible trinity principle' theory states that it is impossible to reach the three aims of independent monetary policy (i.e. national supervision), fixed exchange rates (i.e. financial stability) and free capital mobility (i.e. integrated banking markets) simultaneously. Just like the 'golden standard' around a century ago this means that the EMU cannot be maintained in its current form and must therefore be abolished or modified.
One of the key sources of stress within the EMU is its competitiveness problem and external imbalances. Between 2000 and 2007 there was a boom in lending, particularly in the PIIGS countries, 1 which was encouraged by capital inflows and falling capital market rates in the build-up to the EMU. The growth in lending was a significant driver of economic growth in these peripheral EMU countries and also contributed to rising house prices, a growing current account deficit and a reduction in competitiveness. These developments did not occur in the core EMU countries to the same extent, making it difficult to use common monetary policy to combat them. However, following the start of the credit crisis, the transfer of capital from the core to the periphery came to a sudden stop, leaving the periphery with prices and wage costs that were well out of line with those of the core EMU members. Concerns about the solidity of banks and governments in the periphery led to a
